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Abstract: By following the transformation of one center in Belgrade, Serbia, the article
gives a focused insight into the broader transformations connected to humanitarian aid
and migration response that took place in the aftermath of 2015. Three modes of response
to migration, which are sometimes intertwined, have shaped phases in the development of
the Miksalište center: voluntarism, professionalization and re-statization. The end and the
beginning of each phase have been marked by some changes in migration management as
well as by changes in the modes of funding. The purpose of this paper is to unriddle the
complicated relationships among categories of actors, the dominant modes of response to
migration movements, the wider modes of migration governance, as well as migration-
related policy and local contexts with a micro-level analysis.
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During the »long migration summer of 2015« (Milan/Pirro 2018), »over 1000 of mi-
grants per day« were transiting from Turkey to the countries of Central and Western
Europe (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 2015: 5). Since
the 1990’s, when hundreds of thousands of refugees from former Yugoslav republics
arrived in Serbia, forced migration has not been a widely represented topic in the Ser-
bian media and public. In 2015, this issue was brought forward, and many initiatives
appeared to support the transit movements through Serbia. One of these initiatives,
the ›Miksalište‹, a center for people on the move coming mostly from the Middle
East and Africa, was established as a citizen and volunteer-based point which pro-
vided food and non-food items for refugees in transit in Belgrade in August 2015.
After a while, the center began to be managed by a coalition of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) providing various services. Today, it is a ›one stop point‹ run
by the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration Republic of Serbia (CRM), the cen-
tral state body in charge of reception and migration management, with a few NGOs
involved. I myself was involved in many aspects of the center’s work. My insider
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position, academic background, and interests opened up a space for reflection about
the changes of Miksalište.
I will analyze the case of Miksalište to demonstrate how the changes in Serbian mi-
gration policy in the context of the post-2015 EU border regime influenced the work
and orientation of non-governmental and governmental organizations in Belgrade.
Changes in the functioning and funding of Miksalište are understood as a reflection
of broader changes in migration movements’ management and migration governance.
Changes occurred periodically and the paper is structured according to these periods.
This paper is thus an attempt to unriddle the complicated relationship among cate-
gories of actors, the dominant modes of response to migration movements, the modes
of migration governance, as well as migration-related policy and local contexts with
a micro-level analysis of the transformation of Miksalište. The categories of ac-
tors participating in responses to migration movement are determined by a concep-
tual difference in regard to government organizations (GOs), civil society organiza-
tions (CSOs), NGOs, humanitarian organizations (HOs), volunteer groups, and social
movements.
Three phases in the development of the Miksalište center have been identified,
based on dominant modes of migration response: voluntarism, professionalization,
and re-statization. Voluntarism is here understood as engagement, motivated by
the need to help and »marked apart from remunerated or waged labour« (Malkki
2015: 108). Professionalization refers to a process of transformation of volunteer-
based structures and activities into salaried aid work (see Sapoch 2018: 112). Re-
statization represents an institutional incorporation of non-governmental migration-
related structures into governmental structures (see Agrela/Dietz 2006: 220-221). All
three phases analyzed in this paper are entangled, both conceptually and practically,
with the concept of humanitarianism (Andersson 2017; Fassin 2007; Perkowski 2018;
Sandri 2018), understood here as a more or less institutionalized form of moral action
aiming to alleviate world suffering through various actions and missions (see Fassin
2007: 151). It will be shown how phases in the history of Miksalište developed and
interfered and asked, what their main features and actors were, how they interrelated,
and which issues they brought forward. However, the need to alleviate the »basic hu-
man suffering« (Malkki 2015: 6) through citizen volunteering also masks the deeply
neoliberal process in which people have to »rely on compassion and goodwill of other
people« (Brković 2016: 98–99) instead of state-provided forms of care.
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Framed as a case study research, and by using an autoethnographic participatory
approach,1 I will interpret the developments in Miksalište as an externalization of
EU migration control to third countries (Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016; Casas-
Cortes/Cobarrubias/Pickles 2015; Hameršak/Pleše 2018; Kallius 2016; Stojić Mitro-
vić 2014; Stojić Mitrović 2019; Stojić Mitrović/Vilenica 2019; Tsianos/Karakayali
2010). One of the main arguments of the externalization thesis is that borders are
not merely physical boundaries between nation-states, but are rather externalized and
produced beyond the European Union territory, and that these all-pervading borders
create pressure on other non-EU states. Agreements, treaties, and various migration
policy documents are tools for the externalization of borders that consolidate legal
fences (see Hameršak/Pleše 2018: 13; Kallius 2016: 135). However, some scholars
have warned about a possible reductionism, if ›externalization‹ is merely understood
as a linear and top-down process (see Heck/Hess 2017: 39). In order to prevent
reductionism in externalization theory, authors suggest to focus on struggles, chal-
lenges, disruptions, autonomous migration practices and movements by understand-
ing them as creative forces (see Casas-Cortes/Cobarrubias/Pickles 2015: 898; Stojić
Mitrović/Vilenica 2019: 14; Tsianos/Karakayali 2010: 386). Exactly the struggles,
negotiations, and interactions of actors occupying different power positions in time
will just as much be the focus of the text as the effects these had on the center in
downtown Belgrade.
MIGRATION AND BORDER POLICY
IN POST-SOCIALIST SERBIA
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EU-ACCESSION PROCESS
Right after the Slobodan Milošević regime was overturned in 2000 within the EU-
framework of the ›Stabilization and Association Process‹,2 Serbia initiated the acces-
sion process to the EU. Within this framework, Serbia is obliged to apply EU legisla-
tion, including migration-related policies defined by the Common European Asylum
System (CEAS). Serbia was identified as a potential candidate for EU membership
1 | Autoethnography of participation is a term used to describe both my volunteer and NGO-
based participation in Miksalište, which took place before beginning my PhD and acquiring a
research rank.
2 | The expression ›Stabilization and Association Process‹ was designed specifically for the
›Western Balkans‹, as a construct denoting former Yugoslav countries, without Slovenia and
with Albania (see Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016: 32; Mikuš 2018: 71).
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in 2003, the priorities for the country’s membership application were set through the
European partnership for Serbia in 2008, the status of EU candidate was granted in
March 2012, and the formal start of the accession negotiations took place at the ›First
Accession Conference‹ with Serbia in Brussels, January 2014 (European Neighbour-
hood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations 2019).3 In order to harmonize legislation
with EU regulations, the Law on asylum was adopted in April 2007. The adoption
of this law marked the beginning of the independent asylum system in Serbia, mak-
ing the Asylum Office of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia (instead
of UNHCR) responsible for asylum applications (see Stojić Mitrović 2014: 1110).
Accordingly, the externalization of EU borders is closely related to the process of
harmonizing national asylum policies with EU regulations.
The EU accession process is a much deeper socio-political issue in Serbia, and it is
not limited to asylum, migration, and border policies. Aid provision, as a wider mode
of response to migration, offered by multiple actors in Serbia needs to be analyzed
within the post-war, post-socialist, and neoliberal context of EU integration (Green-
berg/Spasić 2017; Helms 2014; Mikuš 2018). During the civil wars in the process of
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia breakup, many refugees from Bosnia,
Croatia and Kosovo arrived and remained in Serbia (Lažetić 2018: 143). The 1990’s
experience of conflict-related migration in Serbia is certainly shaping representations
about present-day migration movements that include people coming mostly from the
Middle East and Africa. Institutions and actors that provide aid, protection, and ser-
vices have a special significance in the framework of welfare restructuring. In this
regard, »the transfer of welfare functions to various nonstate actors« has to be under-
stood as part of a wider »neoliberal logic of (welfare) state transformation« (Mikuš
2018: 175) within which humanitarian aid and protection offered by the civil so-
ciety emerge as an alternative to previous forms of state-provided care and social
services. Furthermore, »the narrative of Europeanization«, as Mikuš writes, has be-
come »firmly entangled with the scheme of transition« (ibid.: 84), not only in terms
of migration and border policy but also in terms of actors or structures responsible
for care, aid, and service provision.
3 | The chapters 23 (Judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (Justice, freedom and security)
in Serbia’s EU accession negotiations are related to asylum and migration (Stojić Mitrović
2019: 21), and these two chapters were opened in July 2016 (European Neighbourhood Policy
and Enlargement Negotiations 2019).
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MODES OF RESPONSE AND INVOLVED ACTORS
The opposition ›nongovernmental versus governmental actors‹ (Agrela/Dietz 2006)
is rarely questioned and often taken for granted. While the notion of civil society may
include many kinds of actors with different ideological backgrounds and positions,
»in its dominant native sense in Serbia, civil society refers to the sector of liberal
and pro-Western NGOs that are nominally separate from the state, party politics and
business« (Mikuš 2018: 4), and »associated with foreign funding« (Helms 2014: 27).
Here, it will be demonstrated that the GOs in Serbia also depend on foreign funding.
There is also a growing recognition in literature that NGOs constitute only one part
of civil society (see Mikuš 2018: 7) and that the category of civil society should not
be reduced to ›Western-funded‹ NGOs. NGOs are usually non-profit organizations
and they always have a specific aim, vision, and mission. It is also important to note
that an ›NGO‹ does not exist as a separate legal category, and that these groups are
registered in Serbian Business Registers Agency as ›associations‹ or ›foundations‹,
like in the case of Bosnia (see Helms 2014: 27).
Humanitarian organizations are active in refugee assistance worldwide, and they
are understood as »a specific form of NGO« that act under the principles of »hu-
manity, impartiality, neutrality and independence« (Müller-Stewens et al. 2019: 2).
Powerful international NGOs (INGOs) constitute a »humanitarian government« that
administrate people »in a name of higher moral principle« to preserve life and alle-
viate suffering (Fassin 2007: 151). In Serbia, local NGOs are partially funded by
INGOs and international governmental organizations (IGOs). These groups are as-
sociated with (but not limited to) the notion of ›humanitarianism‹ as a mode of gov-
ernance (ibid.; Perkowski 2018). In this article, professionalized humanitarianism is
interpreted as a structured mode of action, where involved actors who provide aid are
professionals employed in NGOs. This mode of governance is identified as prevalent
in the second phase of Miksalište’s history.
Social movements are less formalized than NGOs, and they usually function with-
out payrolls and employees. Social movements often emphasize that they act in the
name of ›solidarity‹, understood as a horizontal structure, and they oppose notions
and practices of humanitarianism and ›charity‹, which are considered as vertical,
top-down structures (see Birey et al. 2019: 11; Sapoch 2018: 70). In Serbia, par-
ticipating in these kind of social movements is often considered as »activism« (see
Greenberg/Spasić 2017: 318). Less structured volunteer and citizen groups work-
ing without clear political or activist agenda have also been involved in migration
response in Serbia (cf. Brković 2016). The first phase of Miksalište’s history more or
less fits into the concepts of »volunteer humanitarianism« (Sandri 2018: 2) as activist
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humanitarian help, »everyday humanitarianism« (Brković 2016), and ›voluntarism‹
as a more general type of unsalaried engagement.
GOs are included in the state or public system, and they are considered to be the
most official and formalized structures of governance. GOs related to social, mi-
gration, and border policy are considered within the framework of this paper. The
increased role of state actors in regulating and controlling migration is understood as
a particular manifestation of a securitarian turn within the EU border regime (Stojić
Mitrović/Vilenica 2019). GOs nominally stand in opposition to above-mentioned ac-
tors. However, in examining the »supposedly self-evident distinction between states
and humanitarians« (Fassin 2007: 150) or »non-governmental versus governmen-
tal actors« (Agrela/Dietz 2006: 205), authors have suggested that »the frontier of
the state and civil society« appears as a »mobile and permeable socially constructed
boundary« (Mikuš 2018: 142). This argument will be used to support the here pre-
sented analysis of the funding modes of government-provided migration assistance.
In the third phase, when Miksalište as a coalition of NGOs became ›re-statized‹, GOs
acquired the dominant role.
The different modes of response to migration movements as well as the involved
actors should not be interpreted as absolute, static, and mutually exclusive. This
paper is rather an attempt to show how certain macro-processes have an effect on the
micro-level, and how dominant modes of response to migration movements could be
divided into phases in the case of Miksalište. Moreover, more changes regarding the
center’s function could appear in the future.
VOLUNTARISM: ›OLD MIKSALIŠTE‹
In summer 2015, a large number of refugees coming mostly from the Middle East and
Africa were transiting to Schengen countries, and migration movements in Belgrade
became more visible (see Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016: 4). Shortly after, these
movements were channeled through the formalized corridor (frequently called the
Balkan route), which made a swift transport of people from one state to another easier
(see ibid.: 61). On 5 August, ›Mikser house‹, a private cultural center and club in
the Savamala area in Belgrade, and NGOs, called for ad hoc humanitarian action,
inviting people to donate clothing and hygienic items for refugees. Three days later,
›Refugee Aid Miksalište‹ was officially opened behind the Mikser house. Mikser
house was located in Karad̄ord̄eva 46 and Refugee Aid Miksalište in Mostarska 5
(hereafter ›Old Miksalište‹ because a new center called ›Miksalište 2.0‹ was opened
later at another address in different capacity). Citizens of Belgrade responded to
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the call and brought clothes, shoes, hygiene items, food, and water to the newly
opened center. A lot of locals from the Savamala area and Belgrade in general as
well as foreigners, often »young people travelling around the Balkans who would
stop after being emotionally affected by the plight of refugees in Serbia« (Milan/Pirro
2018: 144), started volunteering to distribute the collected aid. Old Miksalište was
operating during the fall and winter of 2015/2016. The space was a half open-air site
with stands for distribution, mobile showers, toilets, medical help etc. It was the first
regular aid distribution in Belgrade (see Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016: 43).
Gradually, international and local NGOs recognized the potential of this space and
started to participate with projects, activities, and funding. Many solidarity actors,
both grassroots groups and NGOs, reacted to help people in need (see Milan/Pirro
2018: 131).
The ›emergency response‹ by these solidarity actors was recognized by Serbian
officials (see Stojić Mitrović 2019: 20). In this period, the Serbian government
formed the Working Group for Solving Problems of Mixed Migration Flows (Work-
ing Group for Migration), and the following reception centers were opened to ac-
commodate refugees: RC Preševo, RC Adaševci, RC Šid, RC Principovac, and RC
Subotica (CRMRS 2019). Politicians expressed their support of citizen volunteers
in the media, and they praised their efforts to help the refugees. The most frequent
representations in Serbian media were the narratives about the ›refugee crisis‹ and
the kindness and hospitality of the Serbian society (see Galijaš 2019: 101). At the
same time, Hungary was constructing a physical fence on its border to Serbia (see
Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016: 55) and preparing the ground for more restric-
tive legal fences (see Kallius 2016: 135).
The driving forces of Old Miksalište were local citizens and international volun-
teers. They did most of the organization themselves, but also physical and practical
work. More than 1200 volunteers from 60 different countries helped in some way
during this first phase of Miksalište (WYSTC 2016). The intersection of local and
international volunteers was facilitated due to the fact that there were many hostels
in the Savamala area and parks where migrants were gathering. Many international
volunteers stayed for several weeks in these hostels close to the local parks. Local
CSOs, such as ›Ana and Vlade Divac foundation‹ (a humanitarian organization) and
›Initiative for Development and Cooperation – IDC‹ (a local branch of an interna-
tional volunteer organization), were helping by bringing their volunteers to distribute
aid. Students also got involved in order to do research or internships for their college
or university (volunteer-researchers, internship volunteers). International, humanitar-
ian, and more professionalized organizations, such as Médecins Sans Frontières and
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Save the Children, were also present with installed facilities and offered services and
aid.
In early fall 2015, one group of international volunteers separated and became
›Refugee Aid Serbia‹, because of the tensions that existed among some individu-
als and disagreements about the way in which work and available resources should
be organized. In the very beginning of this phase of voluntarism, the divisions be-
tween different groups or organizations did not exist, or they were at least not so
important. As new funds came in, many of these informal groups became profession-
alized. Former volunteers, sometimes with no prior experience in humanitarian aid
(see Milan/Pirro 2018: 144), showed good managing skills, acquired social capital,
and became in charge of the organization.
Voluntarism was the main, but not the only, type of response in Old Miksalište.
The aid work done by volunteers in Old Miksalište was free of charge. Within the
›refugee crisis‹ discourse created during the summer of 2015 in Belgrade, volun-
tarism emerged as »a reaction to the bureaucratic and at times slow procedures of
aid agencies in emergency situations« (Sandri 2018: 10). The support to refugees in
this period was »framed in emergency terms« (Stojić Mitrović 2019: 20) and focused
on provision of food, medical aid, and non-food items for people transiting through
the corridor. In this context, the ›emergency response‹ discourse was created and
practiced.
As I mentioned above, different civil society actors were providing aid and were
involved in the first phase (international and local volunteer groups, institutional and
non-institutional). Participation of local volunteers and citizens was understood as
»everyday humanitarianism« (Brković 2016), spurred on by significant and generally
positive coverage of the so-called ›refugee crisis‹ in Serbian media, which awakened
empathy towards people in trouble. Also, the participation of volunteers from »60
different countries« (WYSTC 2016), who stayed in Belgrade after being affected by
the ›refugee crisis‹ narrative, could be conceptualized as »volunteer tourism« (Sin
2009). Volunteer tourism or voluntourism (not to be confused with voluntarism) is
understood as »a form of tourism where the tourists volunteer in local communities as
a part of his or her travel« (Sin 2009: 480). Of course, motivations for volunteer work
and subcategories of volunteers are neither fixed nor one-dimensional. In reality,
these motivations overlap and, thus, also these categories. In the following phase, a
more professionalized form of humanitarianism was introduced.
Meanwhile, the so-called Balkan route underwent significant changes. After the
first March of Hope in early September 2015, which was an organized attempt of mi-
grants and activists to resist the asylum policies in Hungary, the Hungarian govern-
ment started to implement more restrictive EU asylum legislations in order to block
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transit through their country, such as re-establishing Serbia as ›safe third country‹
(see Kallius 2016: 140). On 15 September 2015, Hungary closed the border to Serbia
(see Hameršak/Pleše 2018: 10). Migrants redirected their movements to the Croat-
ian border. On 8 March 2016, the borders along the corridor were officially closed
(see Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016: 49), and ten days later, on 18 March 2016,
the EU Commission together with Germany and Turkey introduced the »EU-Turkey
deal« (see Heck/Hess 2017: 36).
Besides this cross-national migratory and border context, changes on the local level
also had an impact on events that occurred in the Savamala area, where Miksalište
is located. Namely, just a few hours after polls closed in the general (parliamen-
tary) elections on 24 April 2016, and the ruling party (Serbian Progressive Party)
won the majority of votes, masked men with baseball bats enforced the overnight
demolition of several Savamala buildings that stood in the way of the Belgrade Wa-
terfront project (see Delauney 2016; Greenberg/Spasić 2017: 322). The Belgrade
Waterfront is a construction project that the Serbian government signed with Eagle
Hills, a company from the United Arab Emirates, which includes the construction of
luxury residential and office buildings, a hotel, a shopping mall, and other buildings
along the Sava River. Also, the coordinators of Miksalište received an order from
anonymous attorneys to move out in 48 hours. On 27 April 2016, Old Miksalište was
demolished to make space for the Belgrade Waterfront (see Dragojlo 2016; Medić
2017: 47; Cantat 2019: 172). These three major shifts—the closing of the borders
for transiting people on the move, the EU-Turkey deal, and the demolition of the
Miksalište center in Mostarska street—opened a new chapter in the development of
the Miksalište center.
PROFESSIONALIZATION: ›MIKSALIŠTE 2.0‹
Although there was no official center any more, in May 2016, the Miksalište team
continued with the distribution of essential clothing and hygienic items and with orga-
nizing children’s activities in the ›Bristol‹ park, alongside other organizations present
there, such as ›Info Park‹. At the same time, they were searching and preparing for a
new location of the center. On 1 June 2016, the center was opened at a new location
in Gavrila Principa 15, a street in the same area just around the parks (hereafter ›Mik-
salište 2.0‹). The object in Gavrila Principa is owned by Preduzeće Ivan Milutinović
(PIM), a company famous in Yugoslavia for waterways engineering and construc-
tion, now in the process of restructuring (economic process related to privatization
in Serbian context), which by coincidence is also the owner of the buildings of the
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›Krnjača‹ Asylum Centre. PIM has been renting the facilities in Krnjača to the CRM
since 1992 to accommodate Yugoslav IDPs, and has been doing the same for asylum
seekers from the Middle East and Africa since 2015 (see Galijaš 2019: 90). However,
CRM did not sign the contract with PIM for the holding of Miksalište 2.0 until April
2019, in the third stage of the institutional biography of Miksalište center. From June
2016 to April 2019, Mikser house and its partner organization ›Mikser Association‹,
which founded Miksalište center in the first place, were the contract holders.
Miksalište 2.0 was upgraded with several services. Many local and international
NGOs implemented their projects in the new center. In July 2016, the center was
temporarily closed because neighbors from surrounding buildings were complaining
about the refugees. The center was reopened after one month. For the next four
months, the center was very busy: the distribution of food and non-food items took
place every day from 9am to 4pm.
During this period, the professionalization of volunteer-based NGOs working with
refugees intensified. Professionalization was achieved both through employing local
volunteers and transforming volunteer-based or grassroots groups into formal, reg-
istered, and structured NGOs. Employees of professional, non-profit humanitarian
organizations could be called »aid workers«, »humanitarians«, or »emergency relief
workers« (Malkki 2015: 30). As professional humanitarian organizations elsewhere,
the employees of the refugee-assistance NGOs in Belgrade wear uniform, including
the logo of the organization that they work for. At the time, newly employed vol-
unteers generally perceived this change as positive, because they felt that they were
finally rewarded for their efforts.
The main reason for professionalizing the Serbian NGOs involved in the distribu-
tion of aid and giving general support was access to grants (see Sapoch 2018: 117).
As manifested so evidently today, the contemporary system of humanitarian aid de-
pends on grants, donations, and projects. It has already been suggested elsewhere that
»the management of humanitarian aid and assistance has gradually become the busi-
ness of professionals« and that humanitarian organizations worldwide »are managed
more like global private companies« (Müller-Stewens et al. 2019: 4). Local NGOs for
refugee assistance in Miksalište (e.g. the Crisis Response and Policy Centre, The Cen-
ter for Youth Integration, Novi Sad Humanitarian Center, Praxis, etc.) are financed
mostly through INGOs and IGOs (e.g. International Rescue Committee, Oxfam, UN
Refugee Agency, UN Women International Organization for Migration, Cooperative
for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Save the Children, Danish Refugee Council),
but are also funded by independent donations or other projects. The INGOs in turn
are financed through large international funds. In 2015, 2016, and 2017, the main
EU fund for refugee assistance in Serbia was the European Civil Protection and Hu-
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manitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) (The Delegation of the European Union to the
Republic of Serbia 2016). As for other types of NGOs in Serbia, the EU has been one
of the biggest donors, which strongly favors established, large, and financially strong
organizations because they are able to co-fund the projects (see Mikuš 2018: 101).
In November 2016, another important shift occurred that shaped the type of aid
offered to refugees. As complaints from the host community increased and anti-
immigrant petitions were created, GOs began to blame the NGOs for migrants not
registering or staying in government provided centers (see Lažetić/Jovanović 2018:
10). The Ministry of Labor, Employment, Veterans and Social Affairs (hereafter Min-
istry of Labor) sent an open letter to NGOs operating in Serbia on 4 November 2016.
With this letter, the NGOs were informed that all necessary assistance was available
within the official reception centers, and, accordingly, assistance in the form of food,
clothing, and footwear outside of the reception centers was no longer acceptable (see
MS 2016). The staff of Miksalište was ordered to stop the distribution of food and
non-food items. The distribution of breakfast and lunch was stopped immediately,
and the distribution of clothes ceased a few days later. Any aid provision of materials
was considered to be a ›pull factor‹ for refugees to stay outside the official centers. At
this time, the Balkan corridor was not in function anymore, and migrants were forced
to choose between three options: either cross the borders irregularly, go back to their
countries of origin, or stay in the offered reception centers in Serbia. »Although the
Open letter was not a formal piece of legislation, it came with important consequences
for groups supporting migrants«, and »it reasserted state control« (Cantat 2019: 173)
by giving the CRM a more dominant role in refugee aid.
The Open letter scared the staff and volunteers working at the center. Organizations
assumed that they had to stop giving humanitarian aid to refugees. They feared to lose
the status of an NGO (see ibid.: 173). Certain big organizations started to withdraw
from Miksalište as they no longer saw an opportunity to help and redirected the funds
towards NGOs working in reception centers. For me and other workers, it was hard
to explain to refugees why they could no longer get food, shoes, jackets etc. Many
of them stopped coming to Miksalište center because they could no longer get ne-
cessities, and the number of people coming on a daily basis drastically decreased.
As I found out in conversations back then, many of them thought that humanitarian
workers were simply hostile to them and did not want to help them anymore. Addi-
tionally, organizations whose main activity was aid distribution had to reinvent their
programs and projects. As a result, one of the two barracks in Miksalište center was
reconstructed into a classroom instead of a distribution stand. There were more so-
cial or occupational activities, such as language (English, German, Serbian, Italian,
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French, Farsi and Arabic) workshops, art classes, and games as well as ›psychosocial
support‹ services.
In December 2016, in the process of reinvention, Miksalište started to work 24/7.
The 24/7 reception service was supposed to compensate the rupture in distribution
and to help in the process of registering newly arrived migrants. This practice is
called ›legal aid‹ or sometimes ›protection‹ in NGO vocabulary. The services of
›legal aid‹ include informing refugees about the asylum system in Serbia, escorting
migrants to the police station for registration, and contributing to the asylum granting
process. NGOs providing legal aid services were present in Miksalište center before
this shift, but, from December 2016 onwards, their role increased. The asylum office,
an organizational unit of the Ministry of the Interior, is responsible for the registration
and asylum procedure. NGOs cannot register newly arrived migrants, but they iden-
tify unregistered people and refer them to the police station, where they are registered
by the Asylum office. A new rule was established then: only registered migrants who
belonged to ›vulnerable groups‹ (women, families with small children, unaccompa-
nied minors, and injured people) and were waiting to be transferred to a reception
center could spend the night and sleep in Miksalište center. The NGO staff worked at
the center during the night.
With the example of NGO services, such as legal aid and protection, one can
achieve awareness for the complex relationship between humanitarianism, human
rights, and security (see Perkowski 2018: 466). Governmental and non-governmental
organizations regularly interfere with one another in this context (see Fassin 2007:
155). In this case, NGOs actually help the government to do their job and register
newly arrived migrants. An issue that is often addressed by humanitarian organiza-
tions is the protection of ›human rights‹ of those who are vulnerable in which NGOs
tread on thin ice in balancing between humanitarianism and securitization. By insist-
ing on vulnerability, NGOs do not only identify and divide individuals into »victims
in need« and »others« (Perkowski 2018: 468), but they also, unwillingly, further con-
firm the security norms. While the humanitarian-security nexus is more evident in
organizations that levitate between militarization and humanitarianism in their oper-
ations at borders, such as Frontex (see Andersson 2017; Perkowski 2018), the nexus
may also be recognized in the work of NGOs that advocate for the protection of ›vul-
nerable‹ people (e.g. unaccompanied minors or single women) in opposition to those
deemed not ›vulnerable enough‹. The dualism between »deserving« and »non deserv-
ing« (Sales 2002, quoted in Fassin 2005: 377) is the ultimate outcome of imposing a
criteria of vulnerability to refugee aid.
In the beginning of 2017, around 2000 refugee men were living in the ›bar-
racks‹, which were presented in international media as a »Serbian Calais« (Mac-
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Dowall/Graham-Harrison 2017; Sapoch 2018). The ›barracks‹ is a colloquial term
for a large site composed of several connected dilapidated warehouses behind the
Belgrade railway station. Harsh winter conditions at the beginning of 2017 created
hazards for refugees living outdoors, in the barracks, or non-weatherized shelters,
making them vulnerable and in need of protection from the perspective of people
providing aid, while, at the same time, refugees were perceived as a ›threat‹ by
right-wing groups. Government officials were concerned about health and security
issues. Media reports on fights and robberies involving migrants and local smugglers
increased, which made the local population nervous (see Lažetić/Jovanović 2018:
9-10).
In April 2017, a group of students from the Faculty of Economics announced a
protest against the migrants in the park in front of the faculty. This was odd, because
migrants had been present in the park in front of the Faculty of Economics for two
years, and there were no complaints from students thus far. The protest was canceled
in the end, but the cancelation did not stop the impact of this campaign to induce a
negative perception of refugees living in the barracks on the side of the local popu-
lation. Several days later, a group of Savamala residents organized a protest against
the refugees using right-wing rhetoric, and they clashed with a local antifa group that
showed up to counter the protest. The group of locals who wrote an anti-immigrant
petition also got involved in the organization of the protests.4 Some members of the
protesting group live in a building next to the Miksalište center. In 2018, tenants even
organized themselves to build an actual metal fence between their building and Mik-
salište in order to prevent contact with migrants. The construction of the metal fence
in the Savamala neighborhood was very symbolic and showed how EU border poli-
cies materialized and stretched from the external borders to internal and local ones
(cf. e.g. Kallius 2017: 19).
The government responded to the increase in numbers of ›stuck‹ refugees living
outdoors and in the barracks by investing in a new reception center in Obrenovac
4 | Theoretically, grassroots right-wing and anti-immigrant movements, which are part of the
»nationalist civil society« (Mikuš 2018: 108), are an additional category of actors responding
to migration movements. They are also under the influence of various international far right
actors in a way that we can even discuss a »Europeanisation« of the Serbian far-right (see
Lažetić 2018: 151). However, this topic and discussion are beyond the scope of this paper.
The activities of local anti-immigration movements are not analyzed as separate phase in the
development of Miksalište because they were not directly involved, and they were not a part of
the center’s programs, even though they were an external, silent factor in the development of
Miksalište that periodically caused ripples in the public sphere.
138 | Teodora Jovanović
near Belgrade. The new reception center in Obrenovac was an old military quar-
ter, reconstructed into a reception center. The transformation of military camps into
»humanitarian sanctuaries« (Agier 2002: 319) is a practice documented worldwide.
Another response to the barracks situation was a discreet permission of the govern-
ment to Oxfam, to implement an emergency relief project distributing winter clothes
and sleeping bags that was performed ›under wraps‹ and in despite of the aid distri-
bution ban. This connivance can be understood both as a temporary rupture in the
re-statization of humanitarian aid and a continuation of humanitarian-security logics
(see Kallius 2016; Perkowski 2018; Petrović 2018).
Activists, international volunteer-based groups, and social movements using the
rhetoric of ›migrant solidarity‹ also started distributing aid in the barracks (e.g. No
Name Kitchen, Hot Food Idomeni, Help-Na, BelgrAid etc.) and »broke the govern-
mental order not to help« (Cantat 2019: 175). However, narratives that interpret the
Open letter only within the framework of the »criminalisation of solidarity« (ibid.:
171) and tend to equate solidarity with aid distribution have certain limits. The bar-
racks, located around ten minutes away from Miksalište center, definitely was »a
space of struggles« (ibid.: 184) for all sorts of actors involved in migration movement
response. These struggles included migrants’ hunger strikes as well as clashes be-
tween GOs, NGOs, and volunteer-based organizations. The final outcome of this »re-
cursive and cross-hatched mix of institutions and people« (Greenberg/Spasić 2017:
322; see also Cantat 2019: 174; Sapoch 2018: 56) were relocations of migrants to re-
ception centers all over Serbia with the help of CRM and the eviction of the barracks
in May 2017. The dominant motive behind the demolition of these informal settle-
ments of migrants in the Belgrade city center was, as stated above, the construction
of luxury buildings as part of the Belgrade Waterfront project (see Lažetić/Jovanović
2018: 10).
In June 2017, the Mikser house cultural center and the club in Karad̄ord̄eva street,
which founded Old Miksalište and continued to be the coordinating body of Mik-
salište 2.0, was closed. The closure of Mikser house was the result of »conflicting
top-down business interests« (Medić 2017: 53) expressed by local real-estate owners
who wanted to build more up-scale clubs and restaurants on the location. The closure
was important for the way the Miksalište center operated because, up until June 2017,
most of the costs (monthly bills and rent) of Miksalište were covered by the Mikser
house owners and modest financial aid from some other NGOs. By closing down the
cultural center, organizations within Miksalište found themselves in another situation
of reconstruction. All NGOs inside the center were asked to contribute financially.
The solution was to create a ›Memorandum of Understanding‹ with precisely defined
duties of each organization within this space that formalized Miksalište 2.0 as ›a
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coalition of NGOs‹. CRM did not provide any kind of financial support at this point,
but rather only wrote a ›letter of support‹, which was sent to major donors. This letter
explained how Miksalište center was one of the most important places for refugee
aid in Serbia. At this moment of crisis, the INGO Save the Children was covering
most of the costs. Eventually, the financial gaps were covered by several international
organizations, and Miksalište survived. One of the problems was that the owner of
the space, the previously mentioned company PIM, due to legal and economic diffi-
culties, agreed to only sign a contract for a year. A one-year contract with the owner
of the space was an obstacle for many donors and organizations to invest. INGOs
feared that their investment would not pay off, if the space were used for something
else after the one-year contract had expired.
The status of Miksalište as a professionalized coalition of NGOs was reinforced by
the creation of the Memorandum of Understanding, but, shortly after, it was shaken
again. The end of the professionalization phase is marked by the withdrawal of the
European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations department (ECHO),
the main source of humanitarian aid funding in Serbia, in March 2018. The main
concern among NGOs was what would succeed ECHO in terms of funding response
measures concerning migration in the area of civil protection. Meanwhile, the interest
of the state sector in the Miksalište center was rising. GOs, the Ministry of Labor’s
Centers for Social Work, and the CRM, in particular, had been gradually bringing
employees into Miksalište center. The cooperation between GO field workers and
NGO field workers was improving, which represented once more the intersections
between professionalized humanitarian and state modes of response to migration.
Mutual information exchange became more intensive. This allowed CRM to officially
enter Miksalište as a crucial actor.
RE-STATIZATION: ›ONE STOP POINT MIKSALIŠTE‹
In the ›Law on Migration Management‹, the CRM is defined as an organization that
performs tasks related to migration management (Migration Management Act 2012),
and, in the latest ›Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection‹, as an organization that
provides material conditions for the reception of asylum seekers (Asylum Act 2018).
In May 2018, CRM started to cover the night shift in Miksalište center because NGOs
did not have enough funds for their employees. I will take this event as the begin-
ning of the re-statization phase within the institutional biography of Miksalište (even
though CRM officially started to run Miksalište center one year later, in April 2019),
because I believe that the relocation of refugees to reception centers became the main
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purpose of Miksalište center at that point, and GOs received more international fund-
ing than NGOs. In June 2018, the Centre for Social Work brought more employees
to Miksalište in the course of the ongoing project MADAD 2 giving »further support
to Capacity Building for Managing Migration Crisis at the Republic of Serbia« (The
Ministry of Labor, Employment, Veteran and Social Policy of the Republic of Serbia
2018). The main activity of social workers employed by the ministry was the support
of unaccompanied minors.
MADAD 2 is a project financed by the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to
the Syrian Crisis, and the value of the project is 16 million euros for 15 months for
The Ministry of Labor, plus five million euros for the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) (EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis 2017).
The so-called MADAD fund replaced the ECHO fund in terms of representing the
central funding source for most of the GOs and NGOs working with migrants in Ser-
bia. The objective of the MADAD action plan was to cater »to the resilience needs
of migrant or refugee populations in the Western Balkans, in particular in Serbia,
through support to the national authorities, including enhancing shelter capacity and
delivery of services« (EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian crisis 2017:
6). ECHO’s objective was, on the other hand, »to provide emergency humanitar-
ian aid to vulnerable refugees, asylum seekers and migrants transiting or staying in
the Western Balkans« (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
2015: 11), mostly through civil society organizations. ECHO was supporting emer-
gency humanitarian help and CSOs, while MADAD was reinforcing the role of the
national authorities and living conditions in reception centers. By following the cen-
tral funds coming from the EU, one can examine how modes of response to migration
have changed in relation to the projects’ objectives.
These major changes did not happen over the night, rather, the state sector grad-
ually permeated through the civil sector. With the appearance of the Open letter
in November 2016, the responsibility of humanitarian aid provision was transferred
mostly to GOs and NGOs working in reception centers. Even though CRM became
the main actor in protecting migrants, the protection and aid provision was not fi-
nanced by a state budget. Migration management in Serbia is economically depen-
dent on funds from the EU (see Stojić Mitrović/Vilenica 2019: 12). In Serbia, more
generally, project financing is not only a feature of the civil sector but also of state
institutions, and this is happening within the context of post-socialist transformations
and accession to the EU. Mikuš extends the notion of »project society« (Sampson
2002, quoted in Mikuš 2018: 43) and argues that Serbian project society is constituted
both by the state and civil sector. By observing how resources from the MADAD 2
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project enabled GOs to consolidate dominance in migration response, the specific
»projectification of the state« (Mikuš 2018: 142) comes to the fore.
The centralization of EU project funding in the Western Balkans is another tool for
imposing control over migration movements outside of the EU and for externalizing
EU borders. Small, local organizations, even with the support of international orga-
nizations, still have to respect government provisions and harmonize their projects
according to those rules. Even though they are non-governmental organizations and
are seemingly independent, the government and donors have considerable leverage
over them, such as if they are perceived to work against particular interests. As the
refugees’ needs are often incompatible with the government’s interests, local organi-
zations have to balance between the needs of refugees, government orders, and the
INGOs’ rules. In this way, local NGO workers and activists »seem to feel ethically
compelled to work both in resistance and solidarity« (Greenberg/Spasić 2017: 322);
to improvise and adapt to new circumstances.
In the beginning of 2019, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) attempted to change the
course of action in Miksalište by bringing the BelgrAid volunteers to run the showers
and washing machines. BelgrAid is a volunteer organization in Belgrade that gathers
international volunteers who want to help refugees and migrants and who usually
only stay at a site for a few weeks or months. MSF has been present with providing
and supervising showers and washing machines in Miksalište since December 2016.
They also run a clinic across the street, in Gavrila Principa 18. MSF cooperates
with international volunteer groups in Serbia, by supporting them and funding their
activities, and together they often oppose the government’s migration policy. After its
foundation in 1971, MSF, one of the largest international humanitarian organizations,
»constructed itself ›against the state‹ via rhetoric that affirmed its independence by
denouncing established powers« (Fassin 2007: 150). The MSF branch in Serbia is
not as powerful as in France, but it uses a similar rhetoric. MSF’s attempt to bring
BelgrAid volunteers to Miksalište (which was not yet officially run by CRM at the
time) can be interpreted as an endeavor to disrupt the processes of re-statization and
to induce a type of response to migration that is based on humanitarian volunteer
work. However, after BelgrAid’s volunteers were present in Miksalište for only two
months, CRM signed the contract with the owners of the space and decided to leave
both BelgrAid volunteers and MSF out of the picture.
By examining migration-related governance structures and practices in Spain, Be-
len Agrela and Gunther Dietz have analyzed re-statized NGO services and argued
that there has been a lot of »back-and-forth movement between public and private
actors at the lower levels of immigration policy« (Agrela/Dietz 2006: 221). The be-
ginning of a re-statization of migration-related governance in Serbia can be traced
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back to the passing of the Law on Asylum in 2007/2008, when the Asylum Office of
the Ministry of Interior started to process asylum applications instead of the UNHCR.
The take-over of the NGO-run center by a GO, as in the case of Miksalište, could be
interpreted as an example of the re-statization of migration response.
In April 2019, CRM officially took charge of the center. The name was changed
to ›One stop point Miksalište‹. The prefix ›Refugee Aid‹ was omitted. In 2015,
while the migration corridor which connected Turkey and Austria was developing
(Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016), and alongside existing asylum centers for mi-
grants who showed the intention to seek asylum in the Republic of Serbia, the state
opened so-called transit and transit-reception centers near main exit spots: first on the
border with Hungary and later with Croatia. The ›one stop‹-center format had also
been established in 2015 in order to enhance the registration of migrants entering Ser-
bia. The first one stop-center had therefore been put in use in Preševo, on the main
entry border with Macedonia (see Contenta in this issue).
The Miksalište space was reconstructed once again to be consistent with the new
functioning of the center. The center was redesigned to look more official, neat, and
minimalistic. Drawings, posters, and other materials created during the workshops
were removed from the interior walls, except the so-called ›children corner‹. A mu-
ral on the exterior walls of the center was almost entirely overpainted: only small
segments of blue paint with the captions ›hope‹ and ›love‹ were left. The main pur-
pose of the Miksalište center turned into the relocation of refugees from the Belgrade
city center to official reception centers. Only those who wanted to register (to be
exact: express their intention to seek asylum), or who were already registered, could
linger in the center. As one volunteer giving recycling workshops in the center said:
»Miksalište is now the center for the distribution of people and not the center for the
distribution of aid«. The role of NGOs inside the center was limited to legal aid ser-
vices and protecting the vulnerable population. CRM also took over the responsibility
of crucial aspects of funding.
The ›securitarian turn‹ in Serbia’s migration policy can be traced back to the second
half of 2016, and it is the result of political developments in the region and pressures
in the negotiation process with the European Union (see Stojić Mitrović 2019: 24).
However, CRM’s role is not only reduced to security. Providing aid to those who want
to be accommodated in reception centers is one of its main tasks. The »security-
humanitarian policies« (Petrović 2018: 46) reveal the tendency to protect the ones
who simultaneously pose a threat, by placing them in a controlled environment and
providing them with food, water, and shelter. Reception centers in this security-
humanitarian context thus appear as the only ›solution‹ for refugees and migrants.
The predominance of reception centers is one of the most important manifestations of
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the »convergence of humanitarianism, human rights and security« (Perkowski 2018:
457), even though the reception centers in Serbia are not closed centers (they are, at
least nominally, open-type centers, meaning that people can go out and come back).
Care for the basic biological needs, on the one hand, and control of movement, on
the other hand (see Petrović 2018: 51), are at the core of the security-humanitarian
mode of governance. Therefore, »even though the humanitarian and securitarian prin-
ciples of responding to migration movements can be seen as opposites, in practice,
both use the same metaphors from the position of power: who may receive help,
who has the right to decide on this, who provides assistance and who receives it,
who has the power to organize assistance, choose, and control actors and activities«
(Stojić Mitrović 2019: 24). The security-humanitarian mode of governance trans-
gresses the differences between states and humanitarians (see Fassin 2007: 150),
non-governmental versus governmental actors (see Agrela/Dietz 2006), and the state
and civil society (see Mikuš 2018), and shifts the focus towards less self-evident
mechanisms of migration governance.
CRM, as a governmental organization responsible for the provision of material re-
sources concerning aid and reception, confirmed the role of main actor in response to
migration movements within a security-humanitarian framework by taking over the
Miksalište center. Enhancing the registration process and transfers to reception cen-
ters has become the main purpose of the center. Material resources and the support-
structure of the EU contributed to this shift.
CONCLUSION
The history of Miksalište center is marked by three dominant modes of response to
migration: voluntarism, professionalization, and re-statization—or, to be exact: vol-
unteer humanitarianism, professionalized humanitarianism and securitarian human-
itarianism. Changes in modes of response on a community level were the result of
the changes in policy on national and regional levels. First, while migrants were vis-
ibly transiting through Belgrade in the summer of 2015, the Old Miksalište center in
Mostarska street was open. The main objective was to help people during the ›refugee
crisis‹, and many volunteers responded within this emergency discourse. Second, the
corridor which enabled many refugees to cross the EU borders without major obsta-
cles was closed, and so was the Old Miksalište, due to the local government’s deci-
sion to make room for the Belgrade Waterfront project. The new center, Miksalište
2.0, was opened at a new location. The professionalized humanitarian approach was
predominant here. The open letter to NGOs, issued by the Ministry of Labor, Em-
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ployment, Veterans and Social Affairs, indicated a re-statization of NGO-provided
services. Third, the new Law on Asylum was adopted, governmental organizations
received most of the EU funding, and the main priority of One stop point Miksalište
was to facilitate transfers of migrants to reception centers in Serbia—this all led to a
consolidation of the re-statization phase.
While Miksalište center was constituted of many actors and groups deriving from
parts of civil society in the first and partly the second phase, it was gradually be-
coming a center run by a particular coalition of professionalized NGOs. This second
phase was marked by professionalized humanitarianism. Every stage had its own dy-
namics. Sometimes, the differences between the modes of response to migration were
not so clear-cut or obvious. The dualism between government and non-government
actors may seem unquestionable, but by following the transformations of the Mik-
salište center, we can observe that these two overlap, not only practically but also
conceptually. Practically, their roles and domains of activities interfere, support, and
confront each other depending on a whole spectrum of wider socio-political and eco-
nomic factors in which regional migration policies are important. One might say
that the institutionalization of the formerly informal and volunteer-based humanitar-
ian center was the highest recognition of the center’s efforts. Others would say that
it is a manifestation of total control by the state. Conceptually, humanitarian NGOs
form a specific kind of ›non-governmental government‹ with their own rules, based
on their moral authority. Also, the devotion to protecting basic human rights blurs
the boundary between humanitarianism and securitization. In this context, the indi-
vidual needs to be recognized and registered by the state in order to achieve these
basic human rights. Invisibility may be dangerous and make migrants vulnerable
to human rights violations. This amounts to a double-edged sword, intrinsic to the
humanitarian-security nexus.
Conceptual categories (voluntarism, professionalization, and re-statization) guide
the activities practiced by different actors (volunteers, aid workers, and governmental
organizations workers). People who act within ›civil society‹ and the ›state‹ do not
exist in a social vacuum. Rather, they are connected and interdependent, struggling
to survive and find solutions in the Serbian post-socialist ›project society‹, which
is trying to join the EU in hope for a more stable future. In Serbia, the relationship
between the state and civil society is understood as antagonistic and binary because of
the way the liberal-democratic state was created after the year 2000. In fact, though,
both state and civil society organizations are involved in similar issues and depend on
international funds and policies.
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»Migrant Crisis« in Bihać, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Azra Hromadžić 163
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